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2It is not true…that the legal order necessarily corresponds to the 
natural order…; it is a policy determination whether legal 
personality should attach and not a question of biological or 
‘natural’ correspondence.1
What is a person? What responsibilities or obligations do we have to 
entities that we recognize as persons under the law? These are not simply 
theoretical questions. Louisiana recently became the first state to 
statutorily designate ex utero embryos as “juridical persons,” with rights to 
sue and be sued.2 The battle over stem cell3 legislation is at base a battle 
over whether the embryos destroyed to harvest the cells should be 
considered persons.4 The international “Great Ape Project” seeks to imbue 
non-human primates with attributes of legal personhood, specifically 
“protections of the right to life, the freedom from arbitrary deprivation of 
liberty, and protection from torture.”5 The Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) is pushing the limits of human-machine 
interfaces in an attempt to create better persons, or even replacement 
“persons” that can perform jobs in lieu of human beings.6 One might 
easily imagine the creation or discovery, in the near future, of an entity 
that is of equal moral status with human beings, but not genetically 
human.7 Far from being mere science fiction, questions of legal 
personhood have already faced courts and legislatures and are likely to 
become more relevant as technology advances. 
Despite the need to provide answers to these issues, legal 
personhood has largely been ignored outside the corporate context, 
although many philosophers have struggled with the concept of moral 
personhood. Although this Article deals indirectly with questions about 
moral status, its focus is on legal status and the ways in which the law 
 
1 Byrn, as Guardian ad Litem for an Infant “Roe” v. N.Y. City Health & Hospitals Corp. 
286 N.E.2d 887, 889 (N.Y. 1972). 
2 LA REV STAT §§ 9:121, 123. 
3 See, e.g., Evan Y. Snyder and Jeanne F. Loring, Beyond Fraud—Stem-Cell Research 
Continues, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 321 (2006). 
4 President Bush seems to have taken the stance that embryos are moral persons, and thus 
entitled to legal protections. 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/07/19/stemcells.veto/index.html?section=cnn_tops
tories. Accessed 7/26/06 
5 http://www.greatapeproject.org. Accessed 7/26/06. 
6 For a list of DARPA projects see, http://www.darpa.mil/body/off_programs.html.
Accessed 7/26/06. 
7 Consider machines with artificial intelligence or extra-terrestrials— should E.T. or 
artificially created persons be considered legal persons? See, e.g., Robert A. Freitas, Jr., 
The Legal Rights of Extraterrestrials, 97 ANALOG SCIENCE FICTION/SCIENCE FACT 54-67 
(April 1977) (An extraterrestrial would not have the status of personhood and would have 
no legal rights. Congress could decide to create a new legal classification—the “pseudo-
person”—which grants the ET a measure of rights and responsibilities.) 
3should recognize rights and interests of certain entities.8 Part II, below, 
argues that there are two bases for according legal personhood status 
(either natural or juridical), and consequently the rights and protections 
that go along with the status. The first basis rests on the interests of the 
entity in question. The second basis for according legal personhood rests 
on the interests of currently recognized human persons. In both cases the 
rights and protections that follow from legal personhood status should be 
limited by the justification for granting the status in the first place. Part III 
applies and considers the implications of the proposed framework to 
various entities including: embryos and fetuses, non-human animals, and 
machines with artificial intelligence. Part IV concludes. The result of the 
analysis provided should be three-fold-- a richer understanding of legal 
personhood as currently applied (e.g., to human beings and to 
corporations),  the development of a framework for evaluating the 
personhood status of novel or not currently recognized entities, and a 
better theoretical reconciliation of some apparently inconsistent laws 
regarding persons.9
II. The Law of Persons
Before beginning, it is worth considering whether there is such a 
thing as “personhood” law.10 It could be that there are simply a lot of 
different areas of law that define persons in different ways depending on 
the purpose of the law. The arguments may be similar to those who have 
taken issue with new categorizations of specialty areas of law, such as 
Internet law, arguing that the issues break down into basic legal areas 
(e.g., contract, tort, criminal), but that there is no unifying theme that 
justifies the special label.11 It is certainly true that there is no express 
definition of “person” in the Constitution, nor has the Supreme Court 
 
8 I’ll adopt an interest theory of rights in this Article, rather than competing “choice” or 
“will” theories. See, JEREMY WALDRON, THEORIES OF RIGHTS, Introduction (Oxford, 
1984). 
9 For examples of arguments about such inconsistencies see William E. Buelow, 
Comment: To Be and Not to Be: Inconsistencies in the Law Regarding the Legal Status of 
the Unborn Fetus, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 963 (1998); Murphy S. Klasing, The Death of an 
Unborn Child: Jurisprudential Inconsistencies in Wrongful Death, Criminal Homicide 
and Abortion Cases, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 933 (1995).  
10 See, e.g., Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a 
Legal Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2001) (stating that “although no coherent 
body of doctrine or jurisprudential theory exists regarding [the legal metaphor “person”], 
a set of rhetorical practices has developed around it.”]. Others have pointed out that there 
is no clear agreement regarding the concept of “person.” See, e.g., Jane English, Abortion 
and the Concept of a Person, 5 CAN. J. PHIL. 233 (1975). 
11 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999) (arguing that although there may be no specialized “law of the 
Internet” there is something to be learned by examining the legal regulation of 
cyberspace). 
4proffered one.12 Moreover, different state and federal statutes define 
“person” differently, depending on their goal.13 Focusing our attention on 
a personhood law as a whole, however, is a useful endeavor. It is likely to 
 
12 See, e.g., Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV.
195 (1996); Kathleen Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction 
and the Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19 (1997). Ducor argues that although 
“the notion of a ‘constitutional person’ is uncertain… [a]ll persons certainly have… a 
minimum bundle of constitutional rights, which can never be suppressed without 
challenging the person’s very dignity and existence.” He acknowledges that “no U.S. 
case law exists on the equivalent of the hard nucleus” but claims “it would include the 
right to due process, the right to own property, the right to bodily integrity, the right to 
live, and the right not to be owned.” Id. Although there may well be a core of rights of 
persons, I will not analyze whether Ducor’s list is correct. Furthermore, Ducor takes the 
position that “everything short of a person will be considered an object”—a framework I 
clearly reject since I argue that embryos can be considered both subjects and objects of 
rights. However, since Ducor makes clear he is coming from a continental/civil law 
perspective (Id. at 197) it is possible that our disagreements stem from our familiarity 
with, and embedding in, different legal systems. Moreover, he explicitly “categorizes the 
embryo or fetus in the womb with other body parts before their separation from the 
person.” Id. at 206. He rejects the notion of giving embryos outside the womb interim 
status and holds they are objects. Id at 211. Living fetuses are to be considered subjects 
while they survive outside the womb (as are viable fetuses after delivery—e.g., babies). 
Id at 212. 
13 See generally Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 LOYOLA L. REV.
357 (1986); (discussing history of treatment of fetus and embryos as persons or property 
under various areas of law).  
For example, the Bankruptcy Act includes individuals, partnerships, and 
corporations, but not governmental units, as persons. § 101(30). Under Ohio’s corporate 
laws, which are typical, “person” is defined to include, “without limitation, a natural 
person, a corporation, whether nonprofit or for profit, a partnership, a limited liability 
company, an unincorporated society or association, and two or more persons having a 
joint or common interest.”  O.R.C. §1701.01(G).   
Foreign governments are “persons” with the right to sue for treble damages 
under § 4 of the Clayton Act.  Pfizer, Inc. v. The Government of India, 550 F.2d 396 (8th 
Cir. 1976), aff’d 98 S. Ct. 584 (1978). Municipalities and other governmental units are 
“persons” under 42 U.S.C. §1983.  Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 
(1978); Cook County, Ill. v. U.S. ex rel. Chandler, 123 S.Ct. 1239 (2003).  An unborn 
child is a “person” for purposes of tort (wrongful death) and criminal law (feticide) 
(Crimes Against Unborn Children Acts) in many states.  Some (18) states follow a “born 
alive” rule for recovery for prenatal injuries.  For a summary of state law, see Sandra L. 
Smith, Fetal Homicide: Woman or Fetus as Victim?  A Survey of Current State 
Approaches and Recommendations for Future State Application, 41 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1845 (2000) and Michael Holzapfel, The Right to Live, the Right to Choose, and the 
Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y, 431 (2002).  Other 
states apply a viability standard at the time of injury. See, e.g., Miller v. Kirk, 905 P.2d
194, 196 (N.M. 1995) (analyzing state wrongful death cases).
In the context of employment law, employers covered by civil rights law include 
any “natural” or “juridical” persons employing persons in return for any kind of 
compensation, for profit or nonprofit purposes, as well as their agents and supervisors.  
42 U.S.C 1983.  Disability discrimination law defines covered persons as “private 
employers” having 15 or more employees.  Americans with Disabilities Act. Local
governments, municipal corporations, and school boards are “persons” subject to liability
under 42 USC § 1983, which imposes civil liability on any person who deprives another
of his federally protected rights. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs 436 U.S. at 683.
5lead to greater clarity in a variety of areas of law (e.g., corporate law, 
animal law), as well as provide a framework under which we can consider 
the application of current laws to new developments (e.g., artificial 
intelligence).14 As a result, conducting an in depth evaluation of legal 
personhood is both necessary and useful. 
Even if there is a coherent law of personhood, why focus on that as 
opposed to merely evaluating legal rights, without the “personhood” label, 
or with a new “pseudo-person” label?15 First, our current system of laws is 
set up to focus exclusively on the rights of persons and not of other 
entities.16 Persons have rights, duties and obligations; things do not.17 
Although there have been challenges to this binary framework,18 thus far 
the U.S. legal system has maintained the distinction. As a result, creating 
new legal categories to address rights of entities along the moral 
continuum would entail great educational and other costs.19 Second, as 
will be made clear by the arguments below, currently existing personhood 
categorizations are flexible enough to accommodate a variety of different 
levels of rights and thus there is little need to create a new category of 
rights holders. 
 
A. Legal Categories
There are two legal categories of persons: natural and juridical. 
“Natural person” is the term used to refer to human beings’ legal status. 
Certain legal rights adhere automatically upon birth, and the designation 
of “natural person” may be taken as shorthand for identifying entities that 
are entitled to the maximum protection under the law. Nonetheless, not all 
natural persons have the same legal rights—children, for example, are 
afforded fewer legal rights than adults.  Additionally, the wording of the 
Constitution suggests that the Framers were careful in their choice of 
 
14 See, e.g., Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 
FLA. L. REV. 135 (2004).  
15 See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 
UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1339 (2000) (suggesting that animals have rights, regardless of 
whether they have standing, and also that they should be given standing, even though 
they are not persons). 
16WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS, ed. By Walter 
Wheeler Cook 75-76  (1923) (stating that all rights of persons are against other persons, 
and that there is no such thing as a right against a thing). 
17 Id. See also Immanuel Kant (distinction between persons and things). 
18 Sunstein, supra note 15. 
19 See, e.g., David Schmahmann and Lori Polacheck, The Case Against Rights for 
Animals, 22 B.C. ENVTL. L. REV. 747 (1995) (pointing out that according animal rights 
“must mean reposing in the government a wholly new and undefined set of powers, 
presumably to be exercised on behalf of an entirely new and vague constituency.” Id . at 
760. And further questions “[w]hat sort of fearsome bureaucracy would purport to 
institutionalize, standardize, and write regulations pertaining to animals’ rights and 
interests implicated by all legislation?” Id.). 
6terms and recognized different rights of different types of natural persons. 
Thus Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution
distinguishes between the rights of “persons” and “citizens.”20 Likewise,
the Supreme Court’s determination in Roe that fetuses are not persons
under the 14th Amendment did not answer the question of whether or not
they should be considered persons with respect to other areas of law. Thus
states have sometimes considered fetuses persons under tort or criminal
statutes. In fact, should the Court overturn Roe v. Wade, it is not likely to
decide that fetuses are persons under the 14th Amendment, but rather leave
the issue up to the states.21 So the law already appears to recognize
different types of persons.
In contrast to “natural person”, the designation “juridical person,”22 
is used to refer to an entity that is not a human being, but for which society 
chooses to afford some of the same legal protections/rights as accorded 
natural persons. Corporations are the best example of this, but juridical 
persons may also include other entities.23 
The designations of “natural” and “juridical” both signify legal 
personhood as opposed to moral personhood. But the terms also signal two 
important distinctions. The first is that an entity labeled a natural person is 
genetically human. The differentiation between genetically human persons 
and other persons may become more important as additional entities lay 
claim to the latter categorization. Juridical persons may be genetically 
human, but there are no non-human natural persons. Second, natural 
persons are those entitled to priority in a rights hierarchy when compared 
with juridical persons. This is not to say that juridical persons might not be 
 
20 “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” US CONSTITUTION, AMEND. XIV (italics added). Thus there 
appear to be certain fundamental rights of all persons, although citizens may have 
additional protections compared to non-citizens (as do residents versus non-residents of a 
particular state). 
21 The Court is understandably wary of recognizing new constitutional rights. Thus, for 
example, in the recent physician-assisted suicide cases the Court found that there was no 
federal constitutional right at stake, and thus states would have to decide whether or not 
to create a state constitutional or statutory right.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
22 Juridical persons are also referred to as “artificial,” “juristic,” and “fictitious/fictional” 
persons. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 636 
(1819) (“corporation is an artificial being”); Standford A. Schane, The Corporation Is a 
Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV. 563 (1987) (referring to 
corporations as fictional persons). 
23 See, e.g., Dictionary Act of the US Code (stating that the word “person” in any Act of
Congress includes, unless the context indicates otherwise, “corporations, companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals.”) 1 USC §1 (2000); See also N.C. G.S. § 12-3(6)(1986) (defining “person”
to include political bodies and corporations).
7granted equal rights as natural persons, but that such allocation of rights 
would have to be justified by the interests involved. In other words, 
natural persons function as the baseline against which other rights 
allocations are judged. Our society was developed by and for natural 
persons, and thus legal rights focus on this group.24 
B. Natural Persons
Currently the legal category of natural persons is limited to human 
beings once born.25 Because rights entail corresponding obligations on the 
part of other rights-holders to respect those rights, recognizing another 
entity as a natural person would necessarily limit the rights of currently 
recognized natural persons.26 In some cases the rights at issue may even be 
diminished if additional entities share the rights. Voting is one example—
if more entities are given the right to vote, the value of any previously 
recognized person’s right to vote is weakened.27 Because of this effect, 
there must be some basis for according legal personhood status that 
justifies the potential diminution of rights for current status holders. Such 
limitation could be justified either by the interests of the entity itself, or by 
the interests of currently recognized natural persons in protecting their 
rights. That is to say, it could be that in order to protect the rights of 
currently recognized persons, the new entity must also be afforded the 
same rights as persons. I’ll consider each of these bases for natural 
personhood in turn. 
1. Interests of the Entity in Question 
 
A full analysis of the philosophical debate regarding moral status or 
moral personhood is beyond the scope of this Article.28 For our purposes, 
 
24 I do not intend take issue with this assertion, although one could certainly argue that 
the preference for natural persons is an artifact of  their power at the time we initially 
created legal protection (had there been non-human persons in power at that time, those 
other entities may well have had priority in a rights hierarchy. But this is an argument for 
another piece, and thus I start my evaluation of legal personhood from the initial premise 
that natural persons are entitled to priority. 
25 Roe v. Wade, supra note 2. 
26 Philosopher Ronald Green suggests that “[b]estowals of status reflect what moral 
agents allow each other to do with the entities in question, or what is the same thing, what 
limitations agents are willing to impose with respect to such entities on each other’s 
liberty of action.” Ronald Green, Toward a Full Theory of Moral Status, 5 AM. J. 
BIOETHICS 44-45 (2005). 
27 RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 113-114 (1993). 
28 Some authors talk about moral status and some talk specifically about (moral) 
personhood. The term “person” when used in a moral context is not necessarily 
coterminous with “human being.” See, e.g., H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS 104 (1986) (“Persons, not humans, are special.”). 
Engelhardt goes on to argue that persons have higher moral standing than other living 
creatures, includes human embryos and fetuses. Id. at 110. His test for personhood 
8it is important only to recognize that there are a number of different 
factors that have been proposed as a basis for according moral status.29 
Characteristics that have been used, either singly or in combination, 
include: biological life, genetic humanness, brain development, ability to 
feel pain, consciousness/sentience, ability to communicate, ability to form 
relationships, higher reasoning ability, and rationality.30 Mary Anne 
Warren and Bonnie Steinbock both provide excellent reviews of the 
different proposals, each pointing out the limitations of the varying 
approaches for determining either moral status, or moral personhood.31 
Their work will not be repeated here. 
According to the prominent legal philosopher Joel Feinberg, an 
entity must have interests to have moral status.32 Steinbock adds that 
“interests” is a term of art which refers to the capacity of an entity to have 
a stake in things and this capacity is contingent on the entity being 
sentient, or consciously aware.33 “Interests” in this sense refers to an entity 
having “a sake or welfare of its own… [and] the expression… is intended 
to emphasize the stake that conscious, sentient beings have in their own 
 
revolves around membership in a moral community and specifically “capacity to be self-
conscious, rational, and concerned with worthiness and blame and praise.” Id. at 107. He 
also notes that non-humans can be persons, such as extraterrestials. Id. Other 
commentators have argued that certain higher reasoning animals should be considered 
moral persons. Whether these entities are entitled to legal status is an issue I will touch on 
below. 
29 See English, supra note 10, at 235 (stating  that “no single criterion can capture the 
concept of a person…. Rather, ‘person’ is a cluster of features, of which rationality, 
having a self-concept and being conceived of humans are only part.” Interestingly she 
goes on to point out that “a fetus lies in the penumbra region where our concept of a 
person is not so simple. For this reason I think a conclusive answer to the question of 
whether a fetus is a person is unattainable”); See generally EMBRYO EXPERIMENTATION:
ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES, ed. by Peter Singer, Helga Kuhse, Stephen Buckle, 
Karen Dawson and Pascal Kasimba (1993). For a bibliography of different moral 
personhood arguments see, 
http://www.tc.umn.edu/~parkx032/B;http://www.columbia.edu/~syw10/personhood.html
PERSON.html.
30 Whether or not one can determine moral status solely on evaluation of characteristics 
is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., George Khushf, Owning Up to Our Agendas: 
On the Role and Limits of Science in Debates about Embryos and Brain Death. 34 J. OF 
LAW, MED & ETHICS 58 (2006) (arguing that science will not answer the questions about 
the moral status of embryos). 
31 MARY ANNE WARREN, MORAL STATUS: OBLIGATIONS TO PERSONS AND OTHER 
LIVING THINGS (1997) and BONNIE STEINBOCK, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH: THE MORAL 
STATUS OF EMBRYOS AND FETUSES (1992) (listing and analyzing the different 
arguments). 
32JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 34 (1984).  
33 Steinbock, supra note 31, at 40-41. Identifying the exact point at which moral 
personhood applies to a developing human may be important, but not necessarily for the 
arguments made in this Article. An entity may or may not meet the criteria for moral 
personhood, but that does not answer the question of whether legal personhood rights 
should be recognized. 
9well-being.”34 One need not agree with Feinberg or Steinbock about 
whether “interests” are necessary for moral status to acknowledge the role 
they play in legal personhood designations.35 If an entity does not have 
interests in the sense identified above, then legal personhood cannot be 
based on the protection of those interests. In other words, we cannot claim 
an entity without interests has a claim to legal personhood for its own 
sake, or because it has interests that must be protected.36 Instead, a 
determination of legal personhood must be based on the protection of the 
interests of others.37 Legal personhood based on the interests of others 
may be more limited than legal personhood based on the interests of the 
entity itself. I’ll return to this point in more detail in subsections below. 
Interests likely develop over a continuum, as the entity develops, 
rather than appear as a single point in time event.38 How legal personhood 
should track this development is a different question. One might designate 
a single point in time for granting legal personhood protections, even 
though the entity has not fully developed all the characteristics in 
question.39 This is essentially what the Supreme Court did in Roe when it 
stated that the constitutional protections of the 14th Amendment apply at 
birth.40 But the lack of constitutional protections prior to that point does 
not determine whether other legal protections apply. For example, using 
birth as the single point in time event for granting human beings’ any legal 
rights may create problems as it fails to recognize the significant 
personhood interests of late-term fetuses. The approaches of jurisdictions 
allowing tort and criminal prosecutions for injury to in utero fetuses is an 
indication that birth is not always the line at which any and all legal rights 
start.41 I’ll return to this issue later. For now it is sufficient to reiterate that 
 
34 Id. at 18 and 20 (emphasis in original). 
35 Steinbock spends quite a bit of time in her book discussing the implications of the 
“interests” approach as well as different uses of the word “interests.” Steinbock, supra 
note 31, at 14-41. I will not repeat those arguments here, but will accept the use of the 
term as defined by her. 
36 I’m considering whether to apply legal personhood status in the first place, not how to 
evaluate whether that status has been lost or how it should be handled for individuals who 
were previously identified as natural persons but have currently lost the ability to form 
interests. 
37 The interests of others can include an interest related to an entity without interests. 
That is to say, I might have an interest in something happening to my car (which itself 
does not have interests). Likewise, assuming without argument that plants do not have 
interests, I might have an interest in preventing the death of my plants. 
38 This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recognition that state interests in 
protecting potential human life become stronger as a pregnancy progresses. Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
39 Steinbock, supra note 31, at 85. 
40 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
41 See, e.g., 114 HARV. L. REV 1745 (describing the conflict between different notions of 
personhood inherent in abortion and feticide laws).  It may be that the application of tort 
and criminal law to actions involving fetuses are based on concerns about other’s rights, 
and are not tied to whether the fetus is a person under the law. Lawrence C. Becker, 
10 
legal personhood based on interests is not possible until the entity has 
developed interests. Prior to that development, legal personhood must be 
based on concerns about protecting the interests of others. 
2. Interests of Others 
 
Natural personhood status need not depend solely on the interests of 
the entity in question. We consider all human beings, once born, to be 
natural persons, regardless of whether they actually have interests. 
Anencephalic infants, for example, are born without a brain cortex and 
thus completely without any cognitive ability;42 they cannot, by Feinberg’s 
definition, have interests.43 Nonetheless we still treat them as natural 
persons.44 The American Medical Association’s suggestion a number of 
years ago that, while still living, these infants be considered appropriate 
organ donors was met with considerable resistance—prompting the AMA 
to reverse its recommendation and issue an opinion asserting that 
anencephalic infants be treated as other natural persons are for purposes of 
transplantation.45 Since anencephalic infants lack interests under the 
model suggested above, the basis for the natural personhood status would 
have to be the protection of the interests of other currently recognized 
persons. There is general societal value in granting full legal personhood 
protections to all human beings at least at birth, regardless of the interests 
of the entity in question.46 While some infants may have failed to develop 
 
Human Being: The Boundaries of the Concept, 4 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 334, 348-350 
(1975) (noting that “A duty not to kill… may be justified by reference to the consequence 
for the agent or society… [rather than] reference to the victim’s ability and title to lay 
claim to the duty.” Id. at 350). It is also possible that the jurisdictions that have such 
apparently conflicting statues are in error and one or the other approaches should be 
reconsidered. 
42 Taber’s medical dictionary defines “anencephalus” as a “[c]ongenital absence of brain 
and cranial value, with the cerebral hemispheres completely missing or reduced to small 
masses.” TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 100 (17th Ed. 1993). Interestingly 
it goes on to state that the condition “is incompatible with life.” Id. In fact, anencephalic 
infants may survive for some short period after birth, if the brain stem is present and with 
a variety of technological interventions. Cognition, however, remains impossible. Nor do 
such infants feel pain. 
43 Steinbock, supra note 31, at 30-36. 
44 See, e.g., Lawrence J. Nelson and Michael J. Meyer, Confronting Deep Moral 
Disagreement: The President’s Council on Bioethics, Moral Status, and Human 
Embryos, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 33, 35 (2005) (providing a general theory of moral status 
that gives born human beings the same moral status as moral agents, even if they lack 
moral agency). 
45 American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Opinion 2.162 
(1992). See also, AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Report, The Use of 
Anencephalic Neonates as Organ Donors, December 1994 (reprinted in 273 JAMA 1614 
(1995)), updated June 1996 Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors—Reconsideration.
46 Yet even as our legal system accepts that at birth humans are entitled to full legal 
protection, it does not truly afford babies and even children equal status with competent 
adult human beings. Part of the difficulty is certainly the need to have someone else 
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any relevant characteristics because of impaired growth, making 
distinctions between neonates47 is extremely difficult. Perhaps the 
complete absence of any cognitive ability, such as is the case with 
anencelphalic infants, can function as a bright line, but almost any other 
attempt at distinguishing based on cognition will be impossible given the 
limited capacity of all newborns.48 And even for anencephalic infants 
society has thus far been unwilling to deny them the protections 
personhood. Perhaps because all human babies share the same external 
form and because there is a societal interest in encouraging specific caring 
behaviors towards all infants (and discouraging other behaviors such as 
infanticide) we include even anencephalic infants in the category of 
natural persons.49 
This “form” argument is not simply about external appearances. A 
doll that looks extremely lifelike would not be entitled to personhood 
protections. The basis of the argument is the effect of the designation (or 
lack thereof) on the rights of currently recognized persons. The more 
similar an entity is to other entities that are designated legal persons, the 
more likely we are to treat them the same. Anencephalic infants are too 
much like other newborn babies to treat as if they were not full legal 
persons. Likewise, while we may stop treatment when someone is 
declared brain dead,50 we do not bury her while still warm and breathing. 
A warm body is too much like a living person.51 
articulate and promote the rights of children since they are unable to do so for 
themselves. But another part of the lack of equal status is the continued recognition of 
parent’s property interests. Property interests attach at the initial developmental stages of 
the embryo. They do not extinguish, but rather are progressively limited by the 
development of personhood interests as the entity matures. 
47 Human infants are commonly referred to as neonates during the first six weeks of life 
after birth. 
48 Or, to put it another way, we have limited capacity to test newborns for cognitive 
ability.  
49 Jane English concludes that some of the restrictions on late-term abortions or 
infanticide can be justified not because the entity in question is a person, but because 
“[o]ur psychological constitution makes it the case that for our ethical theory to work, it 
must prohibit certain treatment of non-persons which are significantly person-like… [lest 
we] undermine the system of sympathies and attitudes that make the ethical system 
work.” English, supra note 10, at 241. See also A.V. Townsent, Radical Vegetarians, 57 
AUSTRALIAN J. PHIL. 93 (1979); PETER CARRUTHERS, THE ANIMALS ISSUE: MORAL 
THEORY IN PRACTICE 115-6 (1992); Carson Strong, ETHICS IN REPRODUCTIVE AND 
PERINATAL MEDICINE: A NEW FRAMEWORK 57-58 (1997) (discussing the “external form” 
and similarity arguments). 
50 Legal death, or brain death, is determined by the absence of brain function even though 
artificial means may be in use to maintain heartbeat and respiration (traditionally death 
was determined by the absence of heartbeat and breathing). 
51 Interestingly, although newborn gorillas are also reminiscent of newborn humans we 
do not afford them legal personhood protections. Perhaps their form is not close enough, 
or perhaps it is a mistake not to afford them protections. I’ll talk about non-human 
animals in more detail in Part III. 
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Except for anencephalic infants who share all characteristics with 
other newborns except presence of brain cortex, and previously recognized 
persons who are temporarily or permanently unable to form interests (e.g., 
unconscious or incompetent individuals),52 there appear to be no other 
situations where natural personhood rights are granted to an entity that 
does not itself have interests. This is an important point. Granting natural 
personhood status provides the entity in question the highest level of rights 
and protections, and thus limits the rights of other natural persons (since 
their rights are limited by the rights of the newly recognized natural 
persons). Justifying such limitation on the protection of the rights of 
existing persons seems counter-intuitive. In fact, it may be that the 
inclusion of anencephalic infants under this reasoning is mistaken. Full 
exploration of this particular debate is beyond the scope of this Article, but 
the analysis provided here may afford insight into a variety of other 
contexts in which the rights and protections of legal personhood are a 
matter of controversy.  For our purposes, the crucial point is that under the 
current legal framework, natural personhood status is only appropriate 
where the entity in question is genetically human and either the entity has 
interests of its own that justify the designation; or, in rare situations, 
protection of the interests of other natural persons justify the designation. 
C. Juridical Persons
Unlike the designation of natural person, there are appear to be few, 
if any, legally established limitations either on what kind of entity can be 
labeled a “juridical person,” or on what rights follow. An initial review of 
the jurisprudence suggests that states have broad authority to designate 
juridical persons,53 and to define the extent of their powers under law.54 
52 It is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate how personhood status should be 
handled for entities that have lost the ability to form interests. My focus here is on the 
initial assignment of personhood status. 
53 It may not be true that a state could designate any entity a juridical person, although 
there is not reason to think that it cannot. However, applying the label to an entity that 
cannot be justified under any of the possible bases and would then have no real rights 
may undermine the use of the term in other contexts making it meaningless. 
54 Many of the constitutional guarantees in the Bill of Rights have been held to apply to 
juridical persons (usually corporations), including the Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection and due process clauses with respect to property interests and First 
Amendment freedom of speech protections. First Nat’l. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 98
S.Ct. 1407, 1416. (1978). Corporations can have privacy interests that protect it from 
unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment.  Dow Chemical Co. v. United 
States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).  Corporations are also afforded double jeopardy protection, 
but not self-incrimination, under the Fifth Amendment. At least since 1886, in Santa
Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 369, the US Supreme Court has
consistently held that the 14th Amendment assures corporations equal protection of the
laws, and that it entitles them to due process of law at least since 1889 in Minneapolis &
St. L.R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Wheeling Steel
Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 577-78 (1949), argued that the Equal Protection Clause,
intended to remedy “gross injustice and hardship” against the “newly emancipated
13 
Despite the lack of legal limitations, I suggest that the rights accorded to a 
particular juridical person should follow from the reason for the 
designation, although in many of the legal cases there is little or no 
discussion of this point. As a result, not all juridical persons necessarily 
have the same legal rights. The rights of natural persons may limit the 
rights that can be granted to juridical persons, as we generally elevate the 
rights of natural persons over juridical persons. As stated above, the 
inclusion of any additional entities in the category of legal persons 
necessarily limits the rights of those previously recognized persons. There 
are two ways previously recognized persons’ rights may be limited—first 
because they now have to respect the rights of the newly recognized 
persons, and second because in some contexts the value of a pre-existing 
right may be diminished. For example, if a state gives corporations the 
right to vote in elections, it would dilute the votes of natural persons.55 
Thus recognition of the rights of juridical persons should be carefully 
limited according to the justification for granting the personhood status in 
the first place. If juridical personhood is necessary to protect the interests 
of the entity, the rights that follow should be those that actually protect the 
interests at stake. Likewise, if juridical personhood is necessary to protect 
the interests of others, the rights that follow should be those that actually 
protect those interests. The sections below consider both of these 
alternatives. 
 
1. Interests of the Entity 
 
Unlike the debate about natural personhood, historically discussions 
of juridical personhood rarely involved a discussion of the moral status of 
the entity in question. Nonetheless, some commentators studying 
 
Negros,” applied only to human beings. It was never intended to protect corporations
“from oppression by the legislature.” Id. at 578.
On the other hand, the privileges and immunities clause is not applicable to 
juridical persons, as are some other “personal” rights. Grosjean v. American Press Co.
297 U.W. 233, 244 (1936). See also United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 698 (1944)
(holding that neither the 4th or 5th Amendment applies to juridical persons because the
nature of the rights are personal. The Court reasoned “whether or not a particular
guarantee is ‘purely personal’… depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the
particular constitutional provision.”). Compare Cook County, Illinois v. US Ex Rel
Chandler, 123 S.Ct. 1239 (2003) (holding that the False Claims Act applies to
corporations because they are equally capable of defrauding or exploiting the exercise of
federal spending power).
The state’s powers to grant or withhold rights to a juridical person, however, are
not unlimited. See, e.g., Railroad Co. v. Harris 79 U.S. 65, 81(1870) (noting that a
corporation is limited by the terms of its charter). And states are not free to enact laws
that would arbitrarily favor individuals over corporations. See First Nat’l. Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1416 (1978); Frost d/b/a Mitchell Gin Company v.
Corporation Commission of Oklahoma 49 S.Ct. 235 (1929).
55 Dworkin, supra note 27. 
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corporate personality theory56 have suggested that it would make more 
sense to have juridical personhood based on the interests of the entity in 
question—mirroring the debates about natural persons above.57 One 
author states that juridical personhood is appropriate when the entity in 
question “behave[s] in those ways that, by and large, are explainable by 
appeal to a coherent set of true empirical generalizations.”58 He goes on to 
assert that the generalizations cluster around the primary state of 
intentionality, which is ascribed based on “observed outward 
manifestations or behavioral evidence.”59 On this basis he claims that 
corporations are moral persons.60 An expert in business ethics, Thomas 
Donaldson, takes the argument a step further and states that if corporations 
are moral persons, then they also should have the rights that natural 
persons have.61 He then considers and rejects the approach that 
corporations are moral persons.62 Instead he argues that corporations are 
sometimes moral agents.63 Still others find it problematic that we would 
ever use the terminology of persons in the context of an entity that is not a 
moral actor.64 
56 In drawing from the literature on corporate personality theory I do not mean to imply 
that embryos are like corporations, but merely that it is useful to examine previously 
developed legal theory regarding juridical persons. 
57 For example, Alexander Nekam states that any entity can be recognized under law as a 
person, regardless of its characteristics, or real or imagined, so long as it is “looked upon 
by the community as a unit having interests which need and deserve social protection.” 
ALEXANDER NEKAM, THE PERSONALITY CONCEPTION OF THE LEGAL ENTITY 26 (1938). 
Nekam distinguishes between administrators and subjects of rights. He notes that 
“[w]hile every right needs an administrator and such administrator can only be a human 
being not deprived of his will, the subject of the right, the beneficiary [sic] of legally 
protected interest, can be, on the contrary, anything which the community regards as a 
unity having socially important interests needing and deserving juridic protection.” Id. at 
33. See also PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 34 (1984) 
(noting that some commentators argue that “juridical person” is simply a label applied to 
all entities that are the subject of rights).   
58 French, supra note 57, at 88. 
59 Id. 
60 Id at 93. French does not want to distinguish moral persons as a subset of persons. 
Rather he thinks that intentional agency is sufficient to be considered a person and thus a 
moral person. He would likely take issue with my distinctions between natural persons 
and juridical persons. 
61 THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY 18 (1982). 
62 Id. at 23. 
63 If they “embody a process of moral decision-making” which requires “1) The capacity 
to use moral reasons in decision-making [and] 2) The capacity of the decision-making 
process to control not only overt corporate acts, but also the structure of policies and 
rules.” Id. at 30. Corporations that fail to meet these requirements should not be 
considered to be moral agents and also “fail to qualify as a holder of rights or 
responsibilities.” Id. at 32. 
64 See, e.g., ELIZABETH WOLGAST, ETHICS OF AN ARTIFICIAL PERSON 88-95 (1992) 
(summarizing debates about corporate personality and arguing that it is “morally 
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There are two problems in drawing directly from the corporate 
personality literature on this point to develop a broader theory of legal 
personhood. The first is that most commentators focus exclusively on 
corporate entities, leaving little room for a broader theory of juridical 
persons that might be applied to non-associative entities. The second is 
that the interests deemed important by the commentators for moral agency 
and thus juridical personhood may not be found even in entities we 
comfortably include in the category of natural persons (e.g., very young 
children, or developmentally disabled adults). In fact, we have little in the 
corporate personality literature that helps identify when it is appropriate to 
use juridical personhood as a basis to protect the entity in question.  As a 
result, such analysis will have to be fleshed out in the context of each 
specific entity under consideration. I suggest some initial steps in Part 
III.65 
2. Interests of Others 
 
In contrast to the corporate personality theories above, most 
discussions about corporate personality do develop the concept of juridical 
personhood based on protecting the interests of already recognized natural 
persons. There are two related arguments for according juridical 
personhood based on the interests of others. First, categorization as a 
juridical person may be necessary for practical reasons, since the law 
requires an object upon which to act. In other words, currently recognized 
natural persons may have an interest in identifying entities as legal actors 
who can have rights or obligations, or sue or be sued. Alternatively, one 
might recognize entities as juridical persons (and give them some of the 
same rights as natural persons) because the failure to do so would 
undermine the rights of currently recognized natural persons.  
The notion of practical necessity is drawn from early articulations of 
corporate personality theory-- fictional entity theory and real entity theory-
- that were based not on suppositions about the moral character of 
corporations, but on the need to create an entity to which the law could 
apply. Fictional entity theory states that corporations are completely 
creatures of law.66 Real entity theory, by contrast, acknowledges that there 
 
hazardous” to separate moral accountability from personhood designations. She 
concludes that corporations should not be treated as persons.). 
65 See Part III: Application of the Framework. 
66 Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. Nat’l. City Bank of N.Y.,170
N.E. 479, 481 (N.Y 1930) (noting that the concession or “fiction” theory states that
corporate personality is “invariably the gift and creature of the State” (citations omitted);
City of Baton Rouge v. Bernard, 840 So.2d 4, 7 (La. App. 1 2003); McCabe v. Illinois
Cent. R. Co., 13 F. 827 (N.D. Iowa 1882) (holding a corporation is a citizen only in the
state of its creation because it cannot exist away from the law which created it);
Mejdunarody Kommerchesky Bank , at 482 (holding the law determines when the life
(legal personality) of an artificial person has been terminated, conditioned by the juristic
quality of the cause for termination).
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is an actual entity, which is termed the “corporation.”67 Both the fictional 
entity theory and the real entity theory are compatible with broad 
discretion on the part of states in determining what rights to accord. But 
although the theories function descriptively, they provide no basis for 
understanding whether and when a particular entity should be considered a 
juridical person.68 Moreover, instead of articulating a basis,69 the judicial 
cases using the theories rely on circular analysis, asserting that 
corporations have a particular legal right because they are juridical 
persons.70 Explaining this lack of normative reasoning, John Dewey 
adamantly asserted that the term “person” in law was merely “a synonym 
for a right-and-duty-bearing unit.”71 The law must have an object upon 
which to act and that object must be a “person.”72 Thus, Dewey argued, 
the development of the term “corporate personality” and the 
accompanying theories are a historical anomaly.73 Dewey may be correct 
 
67 This theory is based upon the idea that “even in the absence of a charter or other token
of the will of government there are groups so natural and so spontaneous as to evoke
legal recognition of a corporate existence.” Petrogradsky, 170 N.E. at 481. The legal 
recognition or lack of recognition of the corporation does not extinguish its existence. 
68 Morton Horwitz has pointed out that these theories functioned to set guidelines as 
corporate doctrine developed, and argues that they were both affected by social 
developments and, in turn, themselves shaped historical development. Morton Horwitz, 
Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 
(1985). See also David Millon, Frontiers of Legal Thought I: Theories of the 
Corporation, 1990 DUKE L. J. 201 (discussing Horwitz’s arguments). The theories did 
not so much lack normative force, as they were subject to differing interpretations, 
although these interpretations were limited by societal conventions. Id at 248-249. 
69 See, e.g., Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of 
Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990) (discussing the application of the Bill of Rights to 
corporations and arguing that the Court has put forth no coherent theory to justify its 
decisions). 
70 Felix Cohen suggests that these questions of law regarding rights of corporations 
would be better decided based on either empirical evidence or ethical argument, rather 
than recourse to circular arguments of legal terminology. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental 
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. LAW REV. 809 (1935). 
71 John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 
655, 656 (1926). Although it is true that to the extent we live in a society governed by 
law there may be no practical distinction between those entities recognized as legal 
persons because they are natural persons or those that are artificial persons—both are 
“legal” persons. But there may be fundamental differences between the rights of entities 
that can claim moral status and the rights of entities that cannot, regardless of official 
legal status. Moreover, while Dewey’s point about historical artifacts of corporate 
personality theory obfuscating debates about the law applied to associations is important, 
the current question of whether legal personhood should be recognized for entities which 
meet none of the characteristics of corporations and only one (genetics) with natural 
persons, should lead us to reexamine the idea that the state can determine the whole of 
what it means to be a person under the law. 
72 Dewey, supra note 71; Hohfeld’s system applied only to persons. Hohfeld, supra note 
32. 
73 See e.g., F.W. Maitland, The Corporation Sole, 16 L.Q. REV. 335 (1900). As a result, 
Dewey concludes that discussions of personhood should be divorced from theoretical 
conceptions of natural or artificial personality. Dewey, supra note 71, at 669. Thus he 
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in his analysis of the historical development of corporate personality 
theory; I will take no stand on this debate. But unlike corporations, the 
categories of embryos, fetuses, non-human animals, and machines with 
artificial intelligence are clearly not “fictional” entities. The potential 
application of juridical personhood to these entities makes it necessary to 
reconsider the possibility of a normative justification for juridical 
personhood based on social interests.74 On the other hand, these new 
entities may not be actors functioning in the legal or social marketplace, so 
there may be less basis for categorizing them as juridical persons on this 
rationale alone. 
An alternative possibility likewise draws on the interests of natural 
persons, but not in terms of practical needs of the legal system. Steinbock 
argues that the symbolic value of potential persons, while less important 
than the moral value of actual persons, functions as a basis to afford some 
protections to embryos and fetuses.75 The term “symbolic value” refers to 
the consideration of the interests of currently recognized persons. 
However, there are many things that we might recognize as having 
symbolic value, but to which we would not think to grant juridical 
personhood. The American flag is one example.76 Moreover, the concept 
of symbolic value is itself limited, since not only would it be inappropriate 
to designate some things with symbolic value “juridical persons,” but 
some currently recognized juridical persons—corporations—do not 
necessarily have symbolic value. So although the notion of symbolic value 
is theoretically appealing, it is of limited use. 
Rather than concentrate on the symbolism of a particular entity, I 
would argue that one should consider broadly the effect on natural persons 
of granting rights of juridical personhood. Recognition of rights of 
juridical persons ultimately may benefit or harm the rights of natural 
persons.77 This is an empirical question and should be evaluated in a 
 
would prefer not to use the term “person” to characterize the debate. Id. at 662.  I think, 
however, that given the common use of the term in our language it serves as a good proxy 
for the underlying issues and brings with it an already developed legal framework. 
74 Frederick Hallis, writing from an English law perspective, points out that a legal 
theory of corporate personality should take into account the real nature of the entities that 
will be considered juridical persons, as well as pragmatic concerns about how the law 
will function. FREDERICK HALLIS, CORPORATE PERSONALITY xxxvii (1978). Hallis argues 
that there are three elements required to be a juridical person: 1) “It must be an organized 
collectivity capable of acting as a whole in furtherance of an interest which the law will 
protect,” 2) “it must have a directing idea… [that] controls its internal and external 
activities,” and 3) it must have “a social value by virtue of pursuing an interest worthy of 
legal protection.” Id. at 241-242.  
75 Steinbock, supra note 31, at 196. 
76 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.W. 310 
(1990). 
77 For example, the nexus of contracts theory justifies corporate personhood, and the 
resulting rights that adhere, based on the freedom of contract rights of the natural persons 
who make up the corporation. Thus the theory functions as a limit on state interference 
with corporations due to the limits the state generally has in interfering with the freedom 
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particular context. Thus granting free speech rights to a particular 
corporation may help or harm the rights of natural persons.78 But making 
inquiries in each case may be too costly or time consuming. Instead of 
adopting such an act-utilitarian approach,79 one might prefer a rule-
utilitarian approach that asks generally whether granting a particular right 
to a juridical person benefits or harms the rights of natural persons.80 
Again, as with all utilitarian inquiries this is an empirical issue, and 
gathering data, particularly generalizable data, may be difficult. 
Corporations are already observable in the marketplace, but we have no 
means of gathering empirical information on the effect of granting or 
withholding certain rights from embryos or fetuses or non-human animals.  
In the absence of data, one might compare the characteristics of the 
entity in question to natural persons and infer whether excluding a 
particular protection would necessarily affect the rights of natural persons, 
based on similarities between the entity and natural persons. This is not a 
question about whether the Framers envisioned the entity in question as a 
“person,” but whether the concept of “person” would or should encompass 
 
of natural persons to contract. In order to enter into such a contract, a group of people
must “organize, assume a name and choose from their number trustees” to become an
artificial person “with general rights and powers, and subject to the obligations and duties
of a natural person, having power to exist, notwithstanding there be a complete change in
its membership.” Miller v. Milligan, 1881 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 12, *8 ((Ohio Common
Pleas).
But see William W. Bratton, The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical 
Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989) (arguing that the nexus of contracts concept 
is not entirely accurate and suggesting a replacement model); David Graver, Personal 
Bodies: A Corporeal Theory of Corporate Personhood, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 
235, 239-240 (1999) (arguing that the nexus of contracts theory “stretches unduly the 
notion of contracts” and “fails to account for the ways corporations act in the world”). 
78 Graver notes that the courts have not been willing to examine the specific motivations 
of corporations in the same way they’ve been reluctant to examine the motivations of 
natural persons exercising constitutional rights. However, he argues that the situations are 
different and we should “draw sharp distinctions among fictional bodies of various types 
of organizations and accord each type of body constitutional rights based on the benefits 
or harms such rights for such bodies will bestow on humans.” Graver, supra note 77, at 
247. 
79 Rule-utiltarianism seeks to effectuate rules that will generally result in the greatest 
good (e.g., a rule that physicians should keep patient confidences). Act-utilitarianism, on 
the other hand, focuses on individual acts and in each cases evaluates what action will 
lead to the greatest good (which may or may not result in the physician maintaining 
confidentiality). TOM L. BEACHAMP AND JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF 
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 343-345 (5th ed. 2001). 
Richard Lippke provides an example of this approach when he develops his 
theory of business ethics (and thus identifies the limits that society should place on 
corporate actions) based on the extent to which things advance or restrict individual 
autonomy. RICHARD LIPPKE, RADICAL BUSINESS ETHICS (1995).  
80 See, e.g, Tara Radin, 700 Families to Feed: The Challenge of Corporate Citizenship,
36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 619, 653 (2003) (suggesting that the Supreme Court chose 
not to extend constitutional protections against double jeopardy and self-incrimination to 
corporations was because the result would have been unjust). 
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the entity given our current understanding of the term.81 To the extent that 
an entity matches the relevant characteristics of entities which have all the 
characteristics of persons—e.g., adult competent human beings—that 
entity should be afforded personhood protections because to do otherwise 
would both be inconsistent and would undermine the rights sought to be 
upheld. Slavery is a good example. Even though the Framers did not 
envision slaves with constitutional rights (in fact many of the Framers 
themselves owned slaves), the entities they did envision as protected 
shared all relevant characteristics with slaves except skin color. The 
exclusion based on such a nominal characteristic undermined the strong 
protections for which the Constitution stands. In contrast to slaves,82 
corporations are not human beings and their exclusion from certain 
constitutional protections may not undermine the precepts upon which the 
Constitution is based, although this may have to be evaluated for each 
right in question.83 
D. Summary
In sum, determinations of both natural and juridical personhood 
rest on the evaluation of two issues: 1) interests of the entity, and 2) 
interests of others. Concerns about protection of the interests of others 
further breaks down into two issues. First, currently recognized natural 
persons may have an interest in identifying entities as legal actors who can 
have rights or obligations. The basis for this rationale is practical need, 
and it is not sufficient for according natural personhood. Since the goal is 
to protect the interests of currently recognized persons, the mere need to 
recognize a legal actor is not enough to limit the rights of other natural 
persons by including additional entities in the categorization. Second, one 
might recognize entities as legal persons because the failure to do so 
would undermine the rights of currently recognized natural persons. This 
rationale is strong enough to provide a basis for either natural or juridical 
personhood. However, if the personhood designation is necessary to 
protect a particular right of previously recognized natural persons, then the 
rights of the newly recognized juridical person should be limited to those 
 
81 This point is often confused. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 67, at 657 (stating that “A 
theory of original intent provides no basis for extending rights to corporations because 
these entities are never mentioned in the Constitution”). Mayer conflates original intent 
with a requirement that we look only to black letter law to evaluate intent. Compare 
David Graver, supra note 77 at 244 (advocating a constitutional theory of personhood 
which he calls “embodied consciousness” focusing on the Framers’ intent, and 
highlighting “three elements: interiority, exteriority, and autonomy”). 
82 The rights of slaves, of course, are linked to their own moral status as well as the 
implications for other persons, whereas the rights of corporations are linked only to the 
interests of persons with moral status. 
83 For a list of Constitutional rights that have been applied to corporations see Radin,, 
supra note 80, at 652. 
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actually necessary to protect the threatened right, and should not infringe 
upon other rights to the extent possible.  
Determining whether natural or juridical personhood is appropriate 
based on concerns about undermining the rights of currently recognized 
persons will not be simple.84 One needs to evaluate whether the entity in 
question is sufficiently similar to currently recognized natural persons. 
The earlier discussion of anencephalic infants provides one of the few 
examples where the entity is almost identical to currently recognized 
natural persons (e.g., normal infants who have interests and thus a claim to 
natural personhood protections), but is granted the natural personhood 
designation due not to its own interests, but based upon concern about 
protecting the interests of others. As noted previously, to argue that the 
interests of other natural persons cannot be sufficiently protected except 
by recognizing the new entity as a natural person itself results in a 
limitation of the rights of the currently recognized natural persons, 
because now these newly recognized natural persons will have equal 
rights. Rarely should this be the case, and anencephalic infants may be the 
only example.85 In most other situations recognition of lesser legal status 
(e.g., juridical personhood) and fewer legal rights will suffice. The 
following section considers the implications of this personhood 
framework. 
 
III. Application of the Framework
I turn now to the application of the above analysis to two general 
“categories” of entities that have raise personhood questions: genetically 
human entities before birth, and non-human entities such as animals or 
machines with artificial intelligence. The following subsections address 
the questions of legal personhood status for each entity in turn, primarily 
developing the concepts in the context of embryos86 and fetuses, but also 
including some initial thoughts about the implications for non-human 
entities. 
 
84 Thus, with respect to extra-corporeal embryos, Mark Sagoff states that “[t]o determine 
[] moral status… society cannot consult biological landmarks but must debate what is 
ethically permissible and culturally appropriate in view of the practical consequences and 
expressive properties of our decisions. From a Kantian perspective we may help secure 
our own humanity by treating embryos with great respect….” Mark Sagoff, 
Extracorporeal Embryos and Three Conceptions of the Human, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 52, 
54 (2005). 
85 And perhaps this is a reason to think that the legal treatment of anencephalic infants is 
incorrect and they should not be regarded as natural persons. Evaluation of this claim is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
86 A handful of commentators have struggled to define embryos’ legal status. See, e.g., 
Andrews, supra note 13; John Robertson, Reproductive Technology and Reproductive 
Rights: In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437 (1990); 
Ducor, supra note 12, at 193; Kayhan Parsi, Metaphorical Imagination: The Moral and 
Legal Status of Fetuses and Embryos, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 703 (1999). 
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A. Genetically Human Entities Prior to Birth: Embryos and Fetuses87 
The logical place to begin is with the question of whether embryos 
are natural persons. If the answer is yes, it follows that all later developed 
stages (e.g., fetus) would also be natural persons. If the answer is no, then 
we must determine whether embryos/fetuses should be designated 
juridical persons, and at what stage of development the entity in question 
should be considered to be a “natural person,” and thus entitled to the full 
panoply of legal rights.  
Currently natural personhood designations are limited to human 
beings after birth.88 So the question for embryos is really a question of 
whether that designation (and all the rights that accompany it) should 
 
87 Before beginning, I’ll say a few words about terminology. Although the term 
“embryo” is the most commonly used label, the appropriate scientific term for the 
fertilized egg at the earliest stage of development is “blastocyst.” A blastocyst is a multi-
celled organism (a group of cells around a fluid filled cavity) that forms four days after 
fertilization. Fertilization is the event that begins with the sperm entering the egg and 
concludes when the genetic material is combined to form the zygote (e.g., the single 
celled organism immediately after the egg and sperm have joined). All so-called “frozen 
embryos” are in fact frozen blastocysts. The cells of a blastocyst are undifferentiated; 
they are able to form into any of the cells in the body, and each one of the cells can be 
separated from the unit and divide to form another blastocyst. This process, called 
“twinning,” would result in two (or more) genetically identical individuals. “Embryo” is 
the term given to the entity at approximately two weeks after fertilization, which 
coincides with the formation of the primitive streak (the structure which will eventually 
develop into the neural system). Occasionally the term “pre-embryo” is used to refer to 
the developing entity during the two-week stage prior to the formation of the primitive 
streak. Despite the scientific definitions, the common usage of the term embryo has been 
extended to cover the many frozen blastocysts currently in storage, as well as those at 
almost all stages of development following fertilization. For simplicity, this Article refers 
to all of the entities in question prior to the fetal stage as embryos. A “fetus” is the label 
given to the entity from eight weeks after fertilization until birth, at which point it is 
referred to as an “infant,” “baby,” or “neonate.” I do not believe that the use of the terms 
(or of proposed different terms) necessarily alters the debate. Certainly there are 
misleading terms, e.g., “developing baby,” which imply that the entity in question is 
closer in attributes to a child than to original gametes (i.e., sperm and egg). But it does 
not appear to make much of a difference in people’s analysis whether the entity is called 
a blastocyst or a pre-embryo or an embryo.  
88 Roe v. Wade. There have been a few recent cases challenging the status of embryos or 
fetuses as persons under different areas of law. Although most of these address the 
actions of pregnant women, a few do not. For example, in one case a judge dismissed a 
suit filed against a stem cell research lab which tried to claim embryos were persons. 
California Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against CIRM, 4(22) BNA MEDICAL RESEARCH 
LAW & POLICY Reporter (November 16, 2005). In another case a judge rejected a claim 
that a pregnant woman and her fetus constitute two persons for purposes of driving in an 
HOV lane.  http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5151368 (2/23/2006), 
last accessed December 15, 2006. There are also some IVF cases that claim embryos are 
persons, although these claims have generally been rejected. See, e.g., Jeter v. Mayo 
Clinic Arizona, 2005 WL 2789387 (Ariz. App. Div. 1, Oct. 27, 2005) (holding that 3 day 
old embryos are not persons under wrongful death statute). 
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apply at some earlier stage of development prior to birth. If the answer to 
that is no, then we might consider whether the embryo should be given 
rights as juridical persons, and at what stage of development these rights 
should apply. Both inquiries begin with evaluation of the interests of the 
entities in question, and then move to evaluation of the interests of others 
in providing protections. 
1. Embryos 
 
Unlike later developed fetuses or even some non-human animals, 
embryos exhibit none of the relevant criteria for having interests89 such as 
a brain/neural system (embryos are a mass of largely undifferentiated 
cells), sentience, consciousness, pain/pleasure perception, capacity to 
relate to others, or ability to communicate. However, embryos are 
genetically human and do have the potential to develop the various 
capacities.90 As one author puts it, embryos are not yet human beings, but 
are “humans becoming.”91 Is genetic humanness and potentiality sufficient 
for according embryos the rights and privileges of either natural or 
juridical personhood?  The biggest problem with using genetic humanness 
and potentiality as a standard are its broad implications.92 The advent of 
cloning technology means that any cell in the human body that contains a 
full complement of DNA has the potential to develop into an entity with 
interests and eventually a person. These clones would arguably be legal 
(and moral) persons in their own right. If potential to become a full moral 
person is the basis for legal personhood, every human skin cell, for 
example, would have a claim for personhood status.93 Potentiality is thus 
 
89 See, e.g., Bonnie Steinbock, The Morality of Killing Human Embryos, 34 J. OF LAW,
MED & ETHICS 26 (2006) (describing why embryos do no have interests and the 
implications for moral status). 
90 Extracorporeal embryos may be significantly different from in utero embryos in their 
potential since, as the science currently stands, they will not fully develop unless 
implanted. See Steinbock, supra note 31, at 200. 
91 Becker, supra note 41 at 337 (“Human fetal development is a process analogous to 
metamorphosis and just as it makes good sense to speak of butterfly eggs, larvae, and 
pupae as distinct from the butterflies they become (to say that they are not butterflies) so 
too it makes sense to say that human eggs, embryos, and fetuses are distinct from the 
humans they become—that they are not human beings, only human becomings.”). 
92 Steinbock, supra note 31, at 59-68, and 199-200 (describing the logical problems with 
arguments that the potential to become an entity with moral status is sufficient to grant 
current moral status). See also Robertson, supra note 86. 
93 Insoo Hyun distinguishes between biological and circumstantial potential. Insoo Hyun 
and Kyu Won Jung, Human Research Cloning, Embryos, and Embryo-Like Artifacts, 36 
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 2, 7 (2006). The first is “potentiality in the biological, quasi-
Aristotelian sense of an entity’s gradually actualizing its preexisting potential.” Id. at 7. 
Circumstantial potential, by contrast, depends on circumstance and choice. Hyun gives 
the example of a medical student’s potential to become a physician. Id. at 7. 
Extracorporeal embryos may have biological potential (not all of them may be viable), 
but not necessarily circumstantial potential (since they may never be implanted). 
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far too broad a basis for according personhood. Even the more specific 
characterization of “potential to develop into a unique individual” would 
not be a useful standard. Cloned individuals would be unique individuals, 
because of differences in environmental factors.94 Genetically identical 
twins are considered separate unique individuals, despite their shared 
genetic code. Moreover, embryos are not necessarily genetically unique 
since twinning is still possible. So potentiality, alone, should not be the 
basis for according legal status.95 
Since embryos themselves do not have interests, and the potential to 
develop those interests is not sufficient, the only basis for legal 
personhood would be the interests of other currently recognized persons. 
Perhaps embryos should be designated as juridical persons because of the 
need to identify a legal actor? It is difficult to understand why this would 
be the case. Embryos have no interests (as defined by Feinberg) of their 
own that need protecting and there is no evidence that the interests of 
other persons suffer if embryos are not recognized as persons. To the 
contrary, recognition of embryos as persons may limit, and thus 
undermine, the rights of currently recognized persons. 
Moreover, evaluation of whether embryos are the type of entity that 
should be covered by legal personhood protections leads to the same 
conclusion. Embryos share one characteristic with natural persons—they 
are human, and clearly the federal constitution is designed to deal with 
human entities. Nonetheless, despite the fact that embryos have the 
potential to share all characteristics with adult competent human beings,96 
they remain easily distinguishable from the entities that are covered. Their 
exclusion from the protections normally afforded “persons” would not do 
damage to the concept itself by creating arbitrary distinctions—embryos 
are vastly different from other protected persons both in terms of capacity 
and form. Embryos share no characteristics with adult competent human 
beings except genetics, and that is not, by itself, sufficient since the 
resulting grouping would be both too broad (it would include every human 
cell) and too narrow (it would exclude a number of creatures who have 
significant interests, such as non-human animals). Nor do embryos share 
any characteristics except genetics with any other humans who are 
considered persons. Moreover, we exclude from legal personhood 
protections a variety of entities that share genetic characteristics with 
 
94 Despite popular belief, clones would be unique individuals. Environment plays a 
significant role in development of identity, and thus at most one could assure that the 
clone was genetically identical, as are identical twins, but s/he would not be the same 
person. Even more complicating, some cells taken from an adult will have mutated, so 
each of those cells would in fact be unique—again creating a too inclusive standard for 
personhood. 
95 See also, David DeGrazia, Moral Status, Human Identity and Early Embryos: A 
Critique of the President’s Approach, 34 J. OF LAW, MED & ETHICS 49 (2006) (arguing 
that embryos are “precursor” organisms, not potential humans). 
96 In this respect embryos are unlike corporations or other entities that have fixed 
characteristics. 
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currently recognized natural persons. For example, cells and tissues from 
the human body are not considered persons, despite their genetic make-up. 
And sentient non-human animals that share over 98% of their genetic code 
with humans are not considered persons.97 In fact, granting embryos legal 
rights may do damage to the underlying precepts by limiting the rights of 
those who more clearly fit the framework. 
In sum, there are neither interests of embryos, nor interests of 
currently recognized persons, that would justify granting legal personhood 
protections to embryos. Debates about embryo disposition should thus be 
primarily addressed through the application of property theory, as I’ve 
discussed elsewhere.98 Embryos should not be afforded rights, the exercise 
of which would infringe on the rights of currently recognized natural 
persons. Thus while a state may choose to designate an embryo as a 
juridical person for certain, very limited, purposes, there is no compelling 
legal rationale for doing so, and thus no rights that must follow. Despite 
states’ theoretical ability to do so, thus far only Louisiana has chosen to 
designate embryos “juridical persons.”99 Furthermore, there may be 
significant limitations to what rights can be granted an embryo, as 
recognition of embryo rights will necessarily infringe upon the rights of 
natural persons. In some situations the infringement may be 
unconstitutional. As the embryo develops, however, it will develop 
interests and those may form the basis for juridical or (eventually) natural 
personhood status.  
 
97 Chimpanzes 
98 Jessica Berg, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos and 
Fetuses, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV.159 (2005) (hereinafter “Owning Persons”). It starts 
from the novel position that recognizing property interests in an entity does not preclude 
their recognition as persons, thus something might both have legal personhood status and 
also be subject to property interests of other persons. At least one author has suggested 
that corporations are also both “persons” and “things.” Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things 
and Corporations: The Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate 
Governance, 47 AM J. COMP. L. 583, 585 (1999).  “Owning Persons” argues that property 
rights are the appropriate basis for legal analysis of embryo disposition, asserting that 
property theory provides a conceptually better fit than the competing procreative liberty 
framework. Not only is the property framework conceptually accurate, it is normatively 
compelling; application of utilitarian, labor and personality theories of property leads to 
the conclusion that individuals (specifically progenitors) can have property interests in 
embryos, fetuses and even children. Finally, property law provides both a descriptively 
accurate explanation of courts’ decisions in embryo cases and also allows judges to draw 
on an existing framework of law to resolve disputes. These arguments are developed and 
explored in more detail in the article. For the current Article, the important point is that 
individuals have property interests in their offspring that must be considered in evaluating 
legal rights, and these property interests do not disappear upon the development of the 
entity’s personhood interests. 
99 For a description of Louisiana law and the development of the statute, see Jeanne 
Louise Carriere, From Status to Person In Book I, Title 1 of the Civil Code, 73 TUL. L. 
REV. 1263 (1999). Other states, however, have attempted to define when life begins for 
purposes of feticide or child abuse statutes. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. SEC. 48.01(1)(2), 
48.02(1)(a) (1998). 
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2. Fetuses 
 
The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade held that the fetus is not a 
“person” under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.100 The resulting furor over the case, and subsequent three 
decades of jurisprudence, plunged this country into a battle for which the 
lines seem to be clearly drawn and not easily surpassed. At the base of 
these debates is the question of fetal personhood. Contrary to popular 
belief, the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Roe did not forestall all 
state determinations of legal personhood.101 Moreover, even if Roe is 
overturned, as some believe to be possible given changes in the 
composition of the Supreme Court, there will still be significant questions 
left unresolved about the legal status of fetuses and embryos. In other 
words, not only is the legal status of embryos and fetuses an open question 
under the current law of Roe v. Wade, but it will remain an open question 
even if the case is overruled. At the very least, if Roe is overruled, the 
Court is highly likely to allow the states to determine for themselves 
whether to accord fetuses legal status, rather than decided it as a matter of 
constitutional law. 
If embryos should not be considered either natural or juridical 
persons, but infants once born are natural persons, there are two remaining 
issues for fetuses. The first question is at what point the fetus should be 
considered a natural person—should the relevant legal line remain birth or 
be earlier? The second question is whether prior to the recognition of 
natural personhood the fetus should be designated a juridical person with 
some, but not all, of the rights of natural persons. The prior section 
explored the limits of potentiality arguments and they will not be repeated 
here. To the extent that the argument for recognizing legal personhood for 
fetuses rests of their potential to develop interests or to become a natural 
person at some future time, it fails.  
 Since the focus of this paper is on legal, not moral status, the 
evaluation of fetal interests is constrained. Legal and moral evaluations are 
intertwined, but not necessarily equivalent.  As stated previously, moral 
status, or its lack, does not determine legal personhood status. An entity 
may lack moral status, but still be considered a legal person. Conversely, 
an entity may have moral status but not be considered a legal person. In 
such a case the lack of legal recognition would not negate the entity’s 
moral status, and the absence of legal obligations would not imply the 
absence of moral obligations.  
The concern is not at what point the fetus develops any interests, but 
at what point those interests should form the basis of legal personhood. 
 
100 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
101 See, e.g., Robert Destro, Is Roe v. Wade Obsolete? 24 HUMAN LIFE REV 55, 61 
(1998). 
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This is a question of line drawing—legal personhood must come into play 
at some point in time even though fetal interests likely develop along a 
continuum. The law can be a rather blunt instrument, and although there 
may be a way to achieve a more nuanced approach through recognizing 
juridical personhood at an early stage and subsequently natural 
personhood, both designations must be based on fairly easily identifiable 
standards. The final determination of whether and how to draw 
distinctions between different developmental levels of human beings may 
depend on practical needs in identifying clear legal lines. If this is the 
case, then the lack of legal personhood recognition will not negate the 
moral claims of the entity in question. The entity may still have certain 
moral rights, and others will have moral obligations to respect those rights.  
There are a number of possible biological events that can be used to 
determine legal status, each having significance in different ways. I will 
not go through all the potential biological landmarks in subsections that 
follow. Rather, this section considers the legal significance of, and 
interplay between, three important factors in fetal development: sentience 
(consciousness), birth, and physical development. I choose not to focus on 
viability since it is a changing line (as technology improves, viability will 
push back towards conception), as well as an incredibly imprecise 
standard—does the standard mean viable for a minute, an hour, a day, a 
week, a month, or longer? 
a. Sentience 
Prior to the development of sentience, which occurs in the latter part 
of the second trimester, the fetus does not have interests of its own and 
thus does not have the requisite basis for natural personhood. Sentience, or 
conscious awareness, is necessary to feel—for example, fetuses cannot 
perceive pain prior to sentience (and thus have no interest in avoiding 
pain).102 Sentience cannot occur until the neural system is sufficiently 
developed to allow for brain functioning and consciousness, at around 22-
24 weeks.103 While this currently provides a rough match with the present 
standards for viability, unlike viability the timeline will not change as 
medical technology advances. Eventually artificial womb technology may 
suffice to keep the ex utero fetus alive from the embryonic stage, and 
allow development to continue. But prior to sentience the fetus will not 
have interests, regardless of its location in or outside the body. This is not 
to say that artificial womb technology should not be used prior to 
 
102 Pain perception may occur even later than the onset of sentience. See, e.g., Susan J. 
Lee, Henry J. Peter Ralston, Eleanor A. Drey, et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic 
Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence 294 JAMA 947 2005 (concluding that given the 
timeline for neural development,  it is extremely unlikely that a fetus perceives pain 
before 27-30 weeks gestation).  
103 Steinbock, supra note 31, at 84-85.  
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sentience, but merely that its use cannot be based on regard for the fetus’s 
own interests, but must refer to the interests of others.  
I’ve pointed out previously that natural personhood is rarely, if ever, 
granted merely on the basis of the interests of others. It is hard to 
understand how the interests of currently recognized people would suffer 
if we don’t include non-sentient fetuses on an equal legal footing. Here 
empirical evidence may be available since at no time have fetuses been 
considered natural persons and there is no evidence that the legal rights 
and interests of currently recognized persons have suffered. Likewise, 
juridical personhood prior to sentience would be inappropriate. Arguably 
the Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizing increasing state interests 
after viability (which maps roughly onto sentience) is compatible with the 
notion that prior to sentience the interests at stake (those of others, not the 
fetus) are too weak to provide significant legal protections to the fetus 
itself. 
But what happens after sentience? At this point fetuses have claims 
based on their own interests. What would be the effect of granting natural 
personhood status to fetuses when they reach the point of sentience? 
Significantly greater restrictions on abortion would result, and states 
would have an obligation to protect fetuses as they do already born 
children. Moreover, designating fetuses as natural persons prior to birth 
would limit the rights of other currently recognized natural persons—
particularly pregnant women whose decisions during pregnancy might be 
constrained in the same way that parents’ decisions are constrained by the 
interests of their already born children. Fetal interests at the point of 
sentience are not strong enough to justify these limitations. Arguably 
newborn interests at the point of birth are not sufficient either. Rather, the 
natural person designation at birth is based on protection of the interests of 
others. However, during the prenatal period, the interests of others are not 
strong enough to justify granting fetuses full natural personhood status or 
protections while still in utero based solely on sentience—other factors 
must also be present. Those who disagree with this position should have 
the burden of showing that limiting the rights of others (by designating 
fetuses as natural persons) would be necessary in order to fully protect the 
rights of currently recognized people. 
Would it be appropriate to consider a sentient in utero fetus a 
juridical person with certain legal protections prior to birth? The answer 
here is likely yes. It would be a matter of state choice (as are other 
juridical personhood designations). Those states that choose to afford 
sentient fetuses juridical personhood status would need to align the rights 
given to the interests at stake. The fact that sentience is not possible prior 
to 22-24 weeks gestation does not mean that the fetus has fully developed 
cognition and perception. At this point, for example, the fetus may not be 
able to feel pain, and thus no interest in avoiding pain.104 If this is so, a 
 
104 Lee, supra note 102. A few letters written in response to the article questioned the 27 
week cut-off point, but even these individuals did not question the lack of pain perception 
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state should not be able to require anesthetic use during all abortions at 22 
weeks based on sentience.105 Legislation providing specific protections 
prior to birth, but after sentience is an area which states might explore in 
more detail. 
b. Cognitive and Physical Development 
The closer the time period gets to birth, the greater the interests of 
the fetus, and the greater the interests of others in providing the same 
kinds of protections as are granted to currently recognized persons (e.g., 
children). If we give newborn infants legal protections based on these 
interests, why not fully developed fetuses? It is hard to understand why an 
entity at this stage should not be considered as having equal legal status as 
an entity outside the womb. But one problem with a “development” 
standard is that it does not take into account fetuses that have problems in 
development. As a result, we might set the standard based on gestational 
age, rather than “full development.”  
At the end of the 8th month of pregnancy (32 weeks), in most cases, 
all of the fetus’s internal and external organ structures have substantially 
developed.106 Natural personhood (and thus constitutional protections) 
could apply at this late stage of development. The result would change in 
the analysis of both abortions and forced caesarian-sections after this time 
point—the rights of the pregnant woman would be balanced against the 
rights of a “fetal natural person.” I will discuss this in more detail in the 
following section.  While it may be tempting to change the timeline for 
according natural personhood, there are reasons to be wary. First, fetal age 
determinations can be inexact.107 Second, even in the absence of natural 
personhood protections prior to birth, the fetus is entitled to significant 
moral status—status which may be recognized under a juridical 
personhood framework. Pregnancy terminations at this point are highly 
restricted and, except in cases of severe fetal abnormality, are usually 
untaken with the goal of achieving a live birth. In cases of severe fetal 
 
before sometime late in the 2nd trimester. See, e.g., letters by Laura Myers et al., Bobbi 
Lyman, Brian Sites and response by Lee et al. above printed at:  295 JAMA 159-160 
(2006). 
105 Perhaps there are other interests that might justify such a requirement, although it is a 
more difficult argument to make. For example, requiring that women be informed, after 
22 weeks, that abortions may cause fetal pain may be based on the state’s interests in 
preserving fetal life (assuming that some woman will choose not to undergo the 
procedure if told the misleading information).  
106 Additionally, at this point infant mortality rates decrease as compared to preterm 
births before 32 weeks. See, e.g., Michael Kramer, Kitaw Demissie, Hong Yang et al. The 
Contribution of Mild and Moderate Preterm Birth to Infant Mortality, 284 JAMA 843 
(2000). 
107 MS Kramer, FH McLean, ME Boyd and RH Usher, The validity of gestational age 
estimation by menstrual dating in term, preterm, and postterm gestations, 260 JAMA 
3306 (1988).  
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abnormality, the issues raised are similar to those raised by neonatal 
euthanasia.108 The only difference is the added complication of the 
pregnant woman’s right of bodily integrity, and while that plays a 
significant role in the analysis it does not change if the fetus is considered 
a natural person. As a result, it both may not be necessary to consider the 
fetus a natural person prior to birth to achieve fetal protections, and may 
significantly complicate the situation to do so.  
Juridical personhood based on developmental or gestational age may 
be appropriate. This is already done implicitly by states which accord 
fetuses limited rights prior to birth by recognizing a variety of causes of 
action for harm done to fetuses at different stages of development. 
Alternatively, gestational age might serve as a bright line cut off for 
sentience. Thus a state might explicitly grant juridical personhood 
protections at 22 weeks gestation, on the assumption that for a normally 
developing fetus that point marks the earliest time at which sentience is 
possible. For fetuses which are not experiencing normal development, the 
presumption of personhood could be rebutted—much as is done currently 
in determining viability or lack thereof. 
c. Birth 
There are practical reasons for choosing birth as the latest point at 
which personhood protections adhere, and thus at which the label “natural 
person” must be applied. Likewise, a fetus born prematurely, but after 
sentience should also be considered a natural person and treated as a full-
term newborn would be treated under the law. Except in the absence of 
brain material or brain activity, it is practically impossible to determine 
sentience using current medical technology, and treatment decisions for 
premature neonates are based on rough approximations of development, 
rather than evaluations of sentience. But what about a fetus “born”109 
clearly prior to sentience,110 as might be the case if artificial womb 
technology advances?111 
The answer depends on whether there are interests of others in 
according legal personhood protections, as is the case with anencephalic 
 
108 This is not to say that the neonatal euthanasia is simple, but that the situations should 
be considered comparable.  See Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal 
Euthanasia, 76 CAL. L. REV. 151 (1988) (discussing neonatal euthanasia). 
109 In fact, it may become possible to fertilize and develop a fetus completely outside the 
womb. 
110 There are also fetuses born prior to viability, that live for a brief period of time. In one 
case the court determined that the lack of viability meant the fetuses could not be 
considered “persons” under the Ohio wrongful death statute. Griffiths v. The Rose 
Center, Case No. 2005CA00256 (Ohio Ct. App., March 29, 2006). 
111 Also of interest would be cases of fetal surgery where the fetus is either partially or 
fully removed from the womb temporarily (or the uterus is removed from the woman 
temporarily). See, e.g., Maggie Jones, A Miracle, and Yet, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE 
(July 15, 2001). 
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infants.112 Unlike anencephalic infants, however, these entities may not 
share any form with later developed humans. Would an eight-week old 
fetus be considered a legal person if in an artificial womb? The interests of 
others do not seem strong enough to accord natural personhood 
protections. But this may be a situation in which juridical personhood 
protections are appropriate. A living but pre-sentient fetus outside the 
mother’s body (in an artificial womb) creates an unusual situation. In 
utero fetuses have the ancillary protections of their mother’s legal 
personhood. But ex utero fetuses would not have these protections.  While 
parental property interests would function and may provide a basis for 
decision making and control (as they do in the ex utero embryo 
context),113 we may well need the additional identification of the 
developing ex utero fetus as a separate legal actor. As artificial womb 
technology advances, this question should receive more thought and 
analysis. 
d. Summary: Juridical to Natural Persons 
Thus far I’ve argued that sentience is crucial for the development of 
fetal interests, and birth/external form each play a role in considering the 
interests of others. The same constraints that limit the scope of juridical 
personhood rights for embryos function in the pre-consciousness context 
for fetuses. Granting juridical personhood status to fetuses prior to 
sentience may undermine the rights of currently recognized persons—for 
example pregnant women’s rights to make a variety of decisions in the 
first trimester would be limited. Even apart from abortion decisions, if we 
grant fetuses such status women may have constraints placed upon their 
decisions to engage in risky activities, or to partake of legal substances 
that are harmful to the fetus. In order to justify this, proponents would 
need to show that the legal recognition was necessary in order to safeguard 
rights of currently recognized natural persons, and that the result would be 
a greater protection of the rights of natural persons overall. This is an 
extremely difficult argument to make, and may fail in many situations. 
 
112 Becker goes so far as to suggest that a fetus born before metamorphosis is complete, 
e.g. an extremely premature infant—which he identifies as the 8th month of development 
when all of the major organs and systems are generated and differentiated—should be 
regarded as the birth of a human becoming. Becker, supra note 41, at 347. But cf. Nealis
v. Baird, 996 P.2d 438, 454 (Okla. 1999) (While the court conceded that there may be a
distinction between biological existence and personhood, it rejected the idea that the
distinction extends beyond live birth). There are also issues of when to withdraw legal 
status protections from a human being that no longer meets the moral status requirements. 
Douglas O. Linder, The Other Right-to-Life Debate: When Does Fourteenth Amendment 
‘Life’ End?  37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1183 (1995) (advising that “when history and 
constitutional text yield ambiguities rather than answers, constitutional interpretation 
should be guided by the moral and economic consequences that might follow from 
equally plausible alternative meanings). 
113 See Owning Persons, supra note 98. 
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Arguments that the lack of legal recognition of fetal rights prior to 
sentience harms the rights of people generally, ignores the harm to the 
rights of people resulting from the recognition itself. Thus prior to 
sentience the fetus should be considered neither a natural, nor a juridical 
person.  There may be restrictions on what can be done with fetuses born 
extremely early, either because of an interrupted pregnancy, or because 
they were never implanted after in vitro fertilization, but these limitations 
are not based on the personhood status of the fetus. The interests of others 
can function to limit many actions, without resulting in personhood status 
for the entity in question. Consider, for example, legal restrictions related 
to actions involving endangered species.114 We may not be allowed to 
destroy the habitat of a particular type of frog, regardless of whether that 
frog can make any claim to personhood. The protections are based on the 
interests of others in maintaining the diversity of species on this planet, 
not necessarily on the interests of the species itself. Likewise, there may 
be a variety of restrictions on what can be done to a pre-sentient fetus 
based on the interests of currently recognized persons. 
Birth, after sentience, is sufficient for natural personhood status—not 
because the interests of the fetus are any greater with the birth, but because 
the interests of others in affording full natural personhood protections are 
strong enough to grant natural personhood. This is true regardless of the 
physical development of the child. Birth, without sentience due to 
developmental problems but at the point of significantly complete physical 
development, also provides a basis for natural personhood, again based on 
the interests of others. Substantially full physical development (8th month 
of pregnancy or later) combined with sentience may be sufficient to 
accord the fetus the protections of natural persons, but careful 
consideration should be given to the practical effect of such designation. 
In the period of time between sentience and natural personhood, 
there may be reasons to provide fetuses the status and protections of 
juridical persons.  Sentience does not mean that the fetus attains equal 
status with adult competent human beings,115 merely that the fetus has 
characteristics that can form the basis for personhood protections based on 
its own (rather than other’s) interests. Moreover, as the fetus develops 
closer to a newborn infant, both its interests may increase and there are 
interests of others that form the basis for judicial personhood 
 
114 See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1339-1340 (Sunstein, however, would argue in favor 
of legal standing for animals). 
115 Steinbock supra note 31, at 24 (stating that the “interest view… does not locate 
beings on a scale of moral importance. In particular, it is silent as to whether all beings 
who have moral status have it equally. Perhaps such features as species membership, 
rationality, and potentiality are relevant to moral status, providing principled reasons for 
counting the interests of some beings more heavily than others.”). 
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protections.116 The following section discusses some initial implications of 
this proposed framework.  
e. Implications 
 My goal here is not to provide a full analysis, nor even a complete 
summary of the relevant issues, but rather to begin to refocus, in light of 
my proposed framework, the debate in some of the most highly 
contentious areas of law such as abortion and interventions on behalf of a 
fetus. Paradoxically, perhaps, the framework I suggest should not result in 
drastic changes in current laws. This is one of the strengths of the 
proposal, as it should not result in great legal upheaval. The most 
significant change should be in how the cases are analyzed, and the basis 
for evaluating future cases that do not fit will under the current model 
(such as fetuses in artificial womb environments). The shift in focus 
should clarify the issues that need further evaluation, and move us away 
from the simplistic, and misguided, assertion that Roe’s determination 
about whether the fetus is a person under the 14th Amendment is the only 
relevant question. 
To begin, I want to make two, interrelated, points. The first is that 
fetuses are considered persons already under the laws of many states. The 
second is that this recognition should be explicit and fetuses should be 
labeled juridical persons for purposes of the application of these rights. 
The status designation serves a number of purposes. It emphasizes that the 
rights in questions are rights of persons, but those of a juridical person, not 
a natural person. To some extent this clarifies the apparent inconsistency 
between laws allowing abortions, for example, and laws allowing tort suits 
for pre-birth injuries. It is not that fetuses are considered persons for some 
laws and not for others, but that they are considered juridical persons with 
specific, but not complete, rights. Finally, explicit recognition allows 
states specifically to identify the rights in question that go with the status, 
rather than simply state that the fetus is a “person” (without limitation) for 
some purposes and not a person for others. This should result both in more 
detailed policy discussions about allowing fetuses certain “personhood” 
rights, understanding that the recognition of the rights limits the rights of 
existing natural persons, and also more attention paid to why we grant 
certain juridical personhood rights to various entities, and whether those 
should be limited or even extended. As a result, we may choose to provide 
personhood protections for sentient fetuses without granting them the 
same rights as fully recognized natural persons. Juridical personhood is 
not a unitary concept; there are different kinds of juridical persons and 
different rights which may adhere. To the extent that states have discretion 
in determining which entities will be considered juridical persons, they 
may make different choices about the types of rights which they grant 
 
116 See Strong, supra note 49, at 41-62 (suggesting that moral status increases along with 
fetal development). 
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sentient fetuses. This has already proved to be the case, as demonstrated 
by vast array of prenatal laws currently in place. 
There is little in the above analysis that should change abortion laws 
which apply prior to 22-24 weeks—prior to the development of sentience, 
other than to reinforce that the restrictions before this time period cannot 
be based on fetal interests.117 The above framework may, however, have 
some implications both for evaluations of abortion restrictions post-
viability and for prenatal and medical care decisions made by a pregnant 
woman towards the very end of the pregnancy. The current “undue 
burden” test articulated in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey118 and reaffirmed by Stenberg v. Carhart119 is 
based on balancing the interests of the woman making the abortion 
decision against the interests of the state. Certainly this balance would still 
be a factor even if the fetus is granted additional legal rights. That is, the 
states would still have interests which may need to be balanced against the 
individual’s interests.  
Designating fetuses as legal persons, however, would create a 
situation in which the fetus’s interests would have to be taken into account 
on their own (not simply indirectly as is now done through the state’s 
interests in protecting potential life). Thus the analysis would look more 
like the analysis that takes place in the context of parental decisions 
regarding minor’s medical care-- specifically refusal of life sustaining 
medical treatment. Others have pointed out that the language of “rights” is 
less helpful in the parental decision making context, since “parental 
rights” do not rest on any clear constitutional basis.120 In contrast, the 
abortion situation does involve constitutional rights of bodily integrity.121 
Weighing the rights of one natural person against another natural person is 
difficult. To the extent a fetus is considered a natural person, the abortion 
debate will have to consider how to weigh the woman’s right of bodily 
integrity against the fetal right to life. Although a complete analysis is 
beyond the scope of this Article, we can draw some initial conclusions. 
Since there are no laws requiring parents to sacrifice their lives for their 
children, it would be hard to imagine that we would accept a legal 
requirement to do so in the context of pregnancy. Thus between the 
woman’s right to life and the fetus’s right to life, the woman’s legal rights 
should be given preference. Harder, of course, is the balance between the 
woman’s right to health, and the fetus’s right to health or even life. The 
varying opinions either allowing or disallowing forced c-sections for 
almost full-term pregnancies is evidence of the difficulty courts have 
 
117 Most of the statutory restrictions are based on state interests in potential fetal life, not 
directly on fetal interests. The two may be the same, or may entail a slightly different 
focus. Analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
118 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
119 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
120 Schneider, supra note 108, at 157-161. 
121 Of course the question will be how extensive that right is and what it entails. 
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weighing these issues.122 The framework I’ve suggested here should 
encourage a shift in thinking about these issues to focus on the parallel 
between this situation and others that involve direct conflicts between the 
health/life of one person and the health/life of another. Moreover, it should 
lead to greater evaluation of the concept and extent of so-termed “bodily 
integrity” rights.123 
My proposal should have three significant advantages over the 
current mode of analysis. First, it will allow states to “experiment” in 
finding the best system of recognizing and balancing legal rights in cases 
involving embryos and fetuses. Since legal personhood should no longer 
be viewed as a closed question, states should be free to consider how best 
to accord juridical personhood status. Second, it should allow us to find 
better and conceptually more appealing answers to new debates in 
reproductive law. This will be extremely important as reproductive 
technology advances and the legal cases continue to move away from the 
traditional abortion context. Finally, it may achieve a compromise position 
in an area that has thus far been marked by heated and divisive 
commentaries. 
 
B. Non-Human Animals and Artificial Intelligence
Although I’ve focused primarily on embryos and fetuses thus far, the 
framework suggested here may be applicable to other entities. The idea 
that we might exclude from legal status an entity that meets all the 
attribute requirements for equal moral status with currently recognized 
persons, but that is not genetically human, raises the question of why 
genetic humanness matters.124 It seems inconsistent to argue for the 
extension of legal protection to a non-sentient multi-celled human 
organism in the beginning stages of development (i.e., an embryo) and 
withhold such protections from fully developed sentient, and perhaps even 
rational, non-human animals.125 If genetics is the sole basis for legal 
 
122 See, e.g., Veronica E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1192 (1987). 
123 Given the time period—post-viability—abortions would not be permissible in most 
states except to save the mother’s life/health, or, in a few states, because of severe fetal 
abnormalities. The former case involves a balancing of mother’s interests against fetal 
interests. The latter case may rest on a determination that the fetus in question does not 
have interests (or has lesser interests because of the abnormalities). This determination 
may be more controversial since it rests on the assumption that we can evaluate 
sentience/interests based on disability—something I’ve suggested is extremely difficult in 
most cases (but perhaps not impossible). See Schneider supra note 108, at 170 
(discussing the conservative dislike of attempts to distinguish between people based on 
worth). 
124 See Paola Cavalieri, THE ANIMAL QUESTION: WHY NONHUMAN ANIMALS DESERVE 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2001). See also the various chapters in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT 
DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS, ed by Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum (2004). 
125 Bernard Rollin takes this a step further and points out that if the potential to become 
rational is sufficient reason to grant non-rational humans moral status, animals should 
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personhood, there must be some explanation as to why this characteristic 
is so important,126 and thus far no one has provided a satisfactory 
argument in this respect.127 
Apart from concerns about consistency and fairness, withholding 
legal personhood protections from an entity that clearly meets all criteria 
for moral personhood is not a priori improper, as long as the interests of 
the entity in question are respected. The danger, of course, is that society 
has tried in the past to limit the legal rights of entities that clearly met all 
requirements for moral personhood-- e.g., women and slaves-- and the 
results were highly problematic, not only because violations of moral 
rights occurred, but because the exclusion of such entities from the system 
of legal protection per se undermined moral rights. In other words, at 
some point the moral and legal rights may be so intertwined that it is 
impossible to respect moral rights without also granting legal rights. But 
the situations of women and slaves may be unique in that they are groups 
that are both human and meet the moral requirements for personhood (e.g., 
they shared all characteristics/capacities with other fully recognized legal 
persons, except sex or skin color).128 By contrast, restrictions on the legal 
status of entities that fail one or the other attributes (e.g., non-human 
animals) may not prevent recognition of their moral rights. 129 
Part of the difficulty in accepting legal status based on moral claims 
of non-human entities may stem from a mistaken insistence on “all-or-
nothing” designations. Categorically determining what entities lack any 
moral status (e.g., a rock) is fairly simple. But most claims of moral status 
map along a continuum. Using such an approach, many animals would be 
granted moral status based on interests, but their placement on the moral 
 
also be afforded moral status because they have the potential to evolve into rational 
beings. BERNARD ROLLIN, ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN MORALITY 52 (1992).  
126 See L.W. SUMNER, ABORTION AND MORAL THEORY 32-33 (1981) (discussing moral 
personhood and stating that a criterion of personhood “must have some plausible 
connection with the possession of certain moral rights.  There must, therefore, be some 
reason for thinking that it is in virtue of an entity’s possessing just these properties that it 
has such rights, that these properties mark the crucial watershed between entities with 
these rights and entities without them.” Id. at 32). 
127 For example, it is common knowledge that humans and chimpanzees share over 98% 
of their genetic code. It is unlikely that the 2% genetic difference is a sufficient basis for 
according legal personhood, without some consideration of other factors. 
128 Of course this was part of what was at issue at the times when women and black 
people were excluded from legal protections. Both were thought to be intellectually 
inferior to white men, and lacking the criteria necessary to be considered of equal moral 
status to white men. Black people were also sometimes referred to as “sub-human,” a 
label which presumably was designed to imply that black people were not even human 
and thus had even less claim to legal status.  
129 It will be interesting to consider the future legal status of chimeras (animal-human) 
mixes), particularly those that are sentient. See, e.g., Jamie Shreeve, The Other Stem-Cell 
Debate, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE 42-47 (April 10, 2005). 
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hierarchy may be lower than that of human persons.130 Legal status might 
follow this hierarchy. For example, some authors assert that great apes and 
dolphins should be considered legal persons based on their mental and 
emotional similarities to human beings.131 Perhaps we should develop a 
system of lesser legal status for non-human animals.132 The fact that the 
law as it is currently written does not include non-human animals does not 
mean that it could not be altered to recognize the rights of entities with 
varying moral status.133 Rather than do so by creating new categories, I 
argue that is what could be done with the concept of “juridical 
personhood.”  
 There are good reasons to consider whether sentient animals 
should be given juridical personhood protections. These may not be 
equivalent for all sentient creatures, but, as with developing human 
fetuses, may vary depending on the interests at stake.134 Thus far no state 
 
130 Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend: The Moral and Legal 
Status of Companion Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 54 (2002) (Some historical views 
generally hold that animals are part of the ‘chain of being’ with humans at the top of the 
moral chain.  Progressively lower rungs are inhabited by rational beings, sentient beings, 
and ‘creatures who are barely alive.’).  Even strong advocates of animal rights, such as 
Peter Singer, accept that persons (which he defines as “sentient beings that are self-aware 
and capable of reason”) are more valuable than non-persons. Warren, supra note 37, at 69 
(discussing Singer). Likewise, our society is built on the notion that laws focus on the 
highest actors in the moral hierarchy—human persons, rather than non-persons, 
regardless of whether the non-persons have a morally valuable life and interests (such as 
avoiding pain).  
131 Gary L. Francione, Personhood, Property and Legal Competence, from THE GREAT 
APE PROJECT, P. Cavalieri and P. Singer, eds. (St. Martin’s Press, N.Y. 1994), article 
found at http://www.animal-law.org/library/ape.htm; Lee Hall and Anthony Jon Waters, 
From Property to Person: The Case of Evelyn Hart,
http://www.personhood.org/lawreview/frompropertytoperson.html.; Mary Midgley, Is a 
Dolphin a Person?, From UTOPIAS, DOLPHINS AND COMPUTERS: PROBLEMS OF 
PHILOSOPHICAL PLUMBING (NY: Routledge, 1996) 
http://www.luc.edu/faculity/twren/phil389/midgley1.html.
132 Many animal rights advocates would accept such a system. For example, in their brief 
in favor of granting personhood rights to great apes Lee Hall and Anthony Jon Waters 
note that their premise is based on the fact that there are only two categories—person or 
property. Hall and Waters, supra note 120, at 2. Presumably they would be open to 
categorization of the great apes in a third category if one were available. See, e.g., 
Morgan v. Kroupa, 702 A.2d 630 (Vt. 1997) (pets occupy “a special place somewhere 
between a person and a piece of property”). 
133 See, e.g., LINDA MACDONALD GLENN, BIOTECHNOLOGY AT THE MARGINS OF 
PERSONHOOD: AN EVOLVING PARADIGM, Thesis (2002), found at 
http://www.jetpress.org/volume13/glenn.html (Glenn discusses genetic engineering, 
transgenics and newly- (or to-be) created life forms and attempts to define each “new” or 
“altered” entity  as a person, from historical, moral, societal, philosophical, theological, 
and legal perspectives.  She concludes by arguing that all life forms, including pre-
embryos, should be treated as persons or property, depending upon where they fall on a 
continuum of property to persons and accorded rights commensurate with the degree of 
“personhood” each entity possesses). 
134 Consider, for example, whether elephants should legal protections to avoid 
psychological trauma. See, Charles Siebert, An Elephant Crackup? NEW YORK TIMES 
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has chosen to provide any legal rights directly to animals; animal welfare 
laws protect the interests of natural persons in preventing harm to animals. 
This, like fetal juridical personhood, is an area ripe for state 
experimentation. If animals are to be considered legal persons with 
specific rights based on their own interests, the protections should reflect 
and be commensurate with those interests. 
It is less appropriate to grant legal status to non-human animals 
based on concerns about the effect of withholding legal status on other 
persons. There is little evidence, for example, that failing to recognize 
animals as juridical persons, or to given them particular rights harms the 
exercise of those rights for human persons. The closest argument to this, 
sometimes used to justify animal welfare laws, is that cruelty to animals is 
linked (or may lead to) cruelty to humans. Even if this is true, this may not 
justify juridical personhood, but merely laws designed to prevent cruelty 
to animals. In such a case the lack of legal recognition would not negate 
the entity’s moral status, and the absence of legal obligations would not 
imply the absence of moral obligations.135 Thus we may have a moral 
obligation not to be cruel to animals, whether or not we have a law against 
such cruelty. 
Additionally, should scientists succeed in creating sentient 
machines,136 our society will have to consider whether those machines 
may also lay claim to legal personhood protections.137 Here, both 
justifications for juridical personhood function— some machines may 
have interests sufficient for legal status, others may be so human-like in 
form that excluding them from personhood status will harm the interests 
of current humans. Like the Replicants in Philip K. Dick’s novel-turned-
movie, Blade Runner, the creation of such entities will challenge our 
conventional notions of what it means to be a person, and our recognition 
 
MAGAZINE, 42, 42-48, 64, 71-73 (October 8, 2006) (describing the possibility of post-
traumatic stress disorder in elephants). 
135 Moral obligations may not preclude killing of the entity in question. See, e.g., Ronald 
Green, supra note 26, at 44 (suggesting that “one can use an entity (embryo; animal) in 
research, and even kill it when necessary, without necessarily failing to respect the moral 
claims that the entity has on us”). 
136 See, e.g., John Markoff, Brainy Robots Start Stepping into Daily Life, NEW YORK 
TIMES July 18, 2006. 
137 See, e.g., Richard Lucas, 2ND AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF COMPUTER ETHICS 
CONFERENCE, Canberra, Australia, December 2000. Lucas argues that computers (and 
other artificial intelligence) may be held to moral standards as persons because they 
possess the following characteristics: reason, the capacity for choice, self-awareness, 
nurturance, co-operation, respect for all life-forms, and moral reciprocity.  “Computer-
ethics” must contain, at least, computer (not human) versions of anonymity, duty, 
equality, intentionality, judgment, and responsibility. See also Linda MacDonald Glenn, 
A Legal Perspective on Humanity, Personhood, and Species Boundaries, 3(3) AM. J. 
BIOETHICS 27 (2003) (considering human-nonhuman chimeras); Michael D. Rivard, 
Toward A General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional 
Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425 (1992) 
(transgenic). 
38 
of what legal rights should follow. Perhaps the creation of such entities 
will force greater attention to the question of legal personhood status, 
since the discussion in the context of embryos and fetuses is marred by the 
strong feelings underlying the protracted abortion debate. 
 
VI. Conclusion
This Article explores and develops a model for according legal 
personhood, arguing that natural personhood designations are extremely 
limited and that juridical personhood designations should be explored in 
greater detail. The work here is by no means complete. The implications 
are not fully developed—rather I stress how this new framework might 
function to shift the focus of debate.  
The purpose of the work done here is to stress that “legal 
personhood” is a rich and complex area of law. In the reproductive area, 
arguments framed in terms of “pro-life” and “pro-choice” have thus far 
been unsuccessful in moving dialogue forward. Likewise, simplistic 
assertions of embryo, fetal, or non-human animal personhood, without 
considering the justifications for such designations, also fail to provide 
sufficient resolutions. Creative solutions are necessary. The analysis of 
legal personhood proposed in this Article is an attempt to provide one such 
solution. Its success will be measured, in part, by the debate it engenders. 
